Cirrus chute deployment -- an incredible story

Michael182/G wrote:

> I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
> quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions. It is not fair for us
> to sit in front of a computer in the comfort of your home and think
> about what you might have done differently than the guy who lived it in
> real time.

Sure, it is quite fair. That is the kind of business the NTSB does all the
time, and mostly for prudent pilots to gain insight and knowledge from
other's mistakes, misfortunes, or bad judgments.

You said it right in your original post, and I quote you:

"I would be interested in your reactions"

Dave,

> . He had NO idea if he was about to black out again. It could
> have happened at any moment.
>

And there's the key point. Pulling the chute was THE ONLY smart option
in that case. It's a perfect example of the benefit of the chute.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Jose,

> Nonetheless, I see this as a weakness in the Cirrus, not a strength.
>
> In any case, he had recovered from the unusual attitude. A few moments
> reflection would have been prudent; again a weakness of the "pull it
> NOW" training that one is reported to receive with the Cirrus.
>

FWIW, I couldn't agree less. The underlying attitude is that "I'm a hero,
I'm THE RIGHT STUFF, I know better, I can handle everything thrown at me,
and damn the torpedoes". Statistics show that a lot of pilots get into a
lot of trouble with this attitude. I would think that this attitude is
very prevalent among pilots, too.

This was the perfect example for the benefit of the chute.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Ben,

> > I just wonder if in retrospect he might have deemed it a better idea to
> > not pull the chute, and to instead fly the plane onto a runway
>
> It's that tendancy to reject a known risk in favor of a future risk
> (where the outcome could be much worse, but it *could* be much *better*)
> that gets a lot of pilots into trouble.
>

I couldn't agree more.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

> (from a medical standpoint, he is right, his flying days are
over...

His flying days are not over unless he wants them to be. What are over
are his days as PIC. He can still fly with medically qualified and
rated pilots and CFIs. Sure, it's not the same, but it's not chopped
liver, either.

-- dave j

Jose,

> Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over.

No, it wasn't. The reason for his blackout was completely unknown. The next
blackout could have come any time. He had no idea how likely that was. The
emergency was still in full progress.

As I said in another post, the underlying attitude shown by some here is the
typical pilot machismo we all know so well - from accident statistics.

> My understanding of the Cirrus (I've never flown one) is that the chute
> decision is to be made pretty much instantly (to preclude further
> development of the spin for which it is designed). This training leads
> to sub-optimal results when the emergency is not a spin.

So what was "sub-optimal" in the result of this? The guy lives, no one got
hurt.


--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Jose wrote:
> In any case, he had recovered from the unusual attitude....

this isn't only about the unusual attitude. This is about
an unusual blackout, loss of control of a limb and the
pilot facing 204 knots at 1900 feet AGL. If he blacks
out again he has as little as 5-6 seconds to auger it into
the ground (if pointed straight down). That ain't much.
Acro training won't help if he unexplicably blacks out again.
Even if trained in acro, which would you rather do...acro
at below 1900 AGL and already above VNE with a severely compromised
physiologic state and then shoot an approach in low VFR and
possibly IMC or use all available resources and pop the chute.
Now make that decision in seconds when the ground is coming
at you quickly.



Gerald Sylvester

There seems to be a sense that consciousness is a binary switch.
Unconscious/Conscious, On/Off. Too many "Man from U.N.C.L.E" and
"Mission Impossible" reruns. See 'epileptic seizures' elsewhere in this
thread.

Despite all the post event analysis by the pilot, perhaps we should
think of him *reacting* to events while in a mental fog. He reacted the
best he could to what he was experiencing and with his brain doing the
best it could.

Jose wrote:
> Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over. It was still a
> crisis situation, but time was no longer of the essence. One should
> consider all available options, including looking out the window before
> pulling the chute if there's time to do so (which there was).
>

"Maule Driver" <MX7180aDriver@nc.> wrote in message
news:KAdze.1759$%y1.58059@twister.southeast. ...

>
> However, having spent some time with an epileptic and having witnessed a
> few seizures, it's clear to me that recovery from a big epileptic seizure
> is not instant. The senses return slowly, particularly the sense of where
> you are and what you were doing (note when caring for a person coming out
> of a seizure that they may not know where they are, time of day, etc

That's my point. It's likely that he made the decision to fire the chute
while still in a mental "fog" from the seizure. He is entirely blameless
and should be congratulated for being alive. But we shouldn't rubberstamp
that action as the correct thing to do, solely out of sympathy for him.

> having spent some time with an epileptic and having witnessed a
> few seizures, it's clear to me that recovery from a big epileptic
> seizure is not instant. The senses return slowly, particularly the
> sense of where you are and what you were doing

Having lived with an epileptic for about half a year, my experience
matches yours. Recovery from a seizure is anything but instantaneous.
It can take several seconds, or several minutes, or longer. There is
no real consistency. There is invariably a period when the epileptic
is conscious and aware, but not all there - still in a mental fog.
There is also a learned response to curtail action until full mental
acuity returns - but I imagine this is a learned response, not
something one instinctively learns after the first seizure.

In other words - I agree with the other poster. The pilot likely acted
in a mental fog. He was in the mental fog through no fault of his own,
and could not possibly be expected to know that his mental faculties
were diminished at the moment. He is certainly not to blame.

Having said that - I think that it is absolutely legitimate to question
whether he took the correct action (remembering always that if he did
not, he can't possibly be faulted for this given his condition).
However, I'm not all that certain his action was incorrect, even if his
reasons are specious.

> no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather

I can't see that the weather was an issue here - bases at 2000, 2-5 in
haze might be marginal VFR - but it's easy IFR by anyone's definition,
and he was on an IFR flight plan.

> concern over the loss of altitude;

1700 ft isn't terribly high, but it's not low either and that plane
climbs quite well especially with only one aboard. He could have been
back at his assigned altitude of 3000 in 2 minutes of cruise climb or 1
minute in a maximum performance climb.

> concern that the plane's structural integrity was compromised by the
> high speed descent and recovery

Concern regarding the structural integrity of the plane is misplaced -
a momentary overspeed without significant overgee, without the violent
shaking that would accompany flutter, and without any indication of
control problems certainly does not call for parachute activation.

> and concern that the weakness in my
> right leg might hinder my ability to control the plane down to the
> runway

The Cirrus doesn't need much rudder - even a no-rudder landing,
assuming no significant crosswind, would most likely mean no damage -
and certainly no injury.

However, the very quality of the reasoning argues for diminished mental
capacity. Also note that there were only three things he had to do for
a proper parachute activation - reduce airspeed below 130 kts, shut
down the engine, and pull the handle. He got one out of three right.
If that's as well as he was going to do, how well was he going to do
for the next few minutes of flight? Sure, he got better - but he
didn't know he was going to get better. He could have gotten worse.

As it happened, not shutting down the engine served him well - he was
able to use it for steering - but that was luck. It was also luck that
he recovered enough to do this. Had he taken minutes rather than
seconds to recover sufficiently (and I can assure you I've seen
recoveries from even mild epileptic seizures take that long) he might
have gotten himself killed. Had he had another seizure (and I've seen
a relatively brief and mild seizure followed by a minute or so of
relative lucidity followed by a much more prolonged and severe seizure)
he would certainly have been better off under parachute.

What I really have a problem understanding is not the people who say
the pilot is not at fault (I agree) nor the people who say that given
his medical condition, activation made sense (I agree), but the ones
who are somehow trying to claim the reasons he gives are valid, rather
than the result of diminished mental capacity at the time the decision
was made.

Michael